hippopotame > bof je maintiens que ça n'a pas de sens de s'intéresser à ce qui aurait été possible, sachant ce qui est effectivement arrivé. Par contre les probabilités des évènements futurs, ça oui.
pollux >

# November 9, 1979 – False "Soviet First Strike" Alarm: The US made emergency retaliation preparations after NORAD saw on-screen indications that a full-scale Soviet attack had been launched. No attempt was made to use the "red telephone" hotline to clarify the situation with the USSR and it was not until early-warning radar systems confirmed no such launch had taken place that NORAD realized that a computer system test had caused the display errors. A Senator inside the NORAD facility at the time described an atmosphere of absolute panic. A GAO investigation led to the construction of an off-site test facility, to prevent similar mistakes in the future. The 1983 film, WarGames, was inspired by an article detailing this and the following event.
# September 26, 1983 – False "US First Strike" Alarm: Soviet early warning systems showed that a US ICBM attack had been launched. Colonel Stanislav Petrov, in command of the monitoring facility, correctly interpreted the warnings as a computer error and did not notify his superiors, even though this was against standing orders and ultimately resulted in serious career consequences for Petrov. # November 1983 – Exercise Able Archer: The USSR mistook a test of NATO's nuclear-release procedures as a fake cover for a NATO attack and subsequently raised its nuclear alert level. It was not until afterwards that the US realized how close it had come to nuclear war. At the time of the exercise the Soviet Politburo was without a healthy functioning head due to the failing health of then leader Yuri Andropov, which is thought to have been one of the contributing factors to the Soviet concern over the exercise.

Pour les deux derniers en particulier, on y a echappé de justesse.

Et sinon pour tes métadonnées ben on pourrait vouloir une fonction du chemin notamment.